The Mongol–Bolshevik revolution: Eurasianist ideology in search for an ideal past  by Glebov, Sergei
ilable at ScienceDirect
Journal of Eurasian Studies 2 (2011) 103–114Contents lists avaJournal of Eurasian Studies
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/eurasThe Mongol–Bolshevik revolution: Eurasianist ideology in search for an
ideal pastq
Sergei Glebov
Dept. of European History at Five College, United Statesa r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 28 September 2009
Accepted 10 February 2010q I would like to thank Ilya Gerasimov, Alexander
Shevzov for their thoughtful comments on this text.
of course, mine.
E-mail address: hammond@mit.edu.
1879-3665/$ – see front matter Copyright2010,Asia
doi:10.1016/j.euras.2010.10.007In the decades following the disintegration of the Soviet
Union “Eurasia” readily emerged as a convenient (and
disputed) term to designate the former Soviet space. For
some scholars, it contained the promise of revealing
multifaceted cross-cultural (across the Old World) and
cross-disciplinary (across disciplines studying the Old
World) encounters within that space. For others, “Eurasia”
was a geopolitical concept rooted in Russian imperial
tradition and its extensive use entailed a recuperation of
cultural and political strategies of the former imperial
center (von Hagen, 2004a; von Hagen, 2004b; Kotkin,
2007a, 2007b; Annual conference of the HavighurstSemyonov, and Ver
All mistakes remain
1 von Hagen (2004a); von Hagen (2004b); Kotkin (2007a). Tellingly, the
title of the annual conference of scholars interested in post-socialist
-PaciﬁcResearchCena
,
ter,HanyCenter, 2006).1 This ambivalence with respect to “Eurasia”
continues to draw attention to the legacy of the Eurasianist
movement which for the ﬁrst time employed the term
“Eurasia” to describe the former Russian Empire and to
endow “Eurasia” with cultural, political and geographical
content (Böss, 1962; Glebov, 2008; Laruelle, 1999;
Riasanovsky, 1964, 1967, 1972a; Wiederkehr, 2007).2
Eurasianism as an intellectual and political movement
emerged among the émigrés from the former Russian
Empire in the 1920s and dissolved in the early 1930s.
Central to the Eurasianist ideology was a holistic vision of
Eurasia as a geographical system, an ethno-cultural unity,transformations was Locating “Eurasia” in Postsocialist Studies: The
Geopolitics of Naming. See also the published version Kotkin (2007b).
Another interesting example of a conference dealing with Eurasia was the
colloquium at Lancaster University “Constructing Regional identities in
the Post-Communist Space: Eurasia or Europe?”, held on June 27–28. See
http://www.lancs.ac.uk/ias/annualprogramme/regionalism/eurasia/
index.htm, last accessed June 15, 2008. Also see Annual conference of the
Havighurst Center (2006). The VIII World Congress of the International
Council for Central and East European Studies will take place in Stock-
holm, Sweden, on 26–31 July 2010 under the title “Eurasia: Prospects for
Wider Cooperation.” www.iccees2010.se.
2 Böss (1962); Riasanovsky (1964, 1967); Riasanovsky (1972a,b). For
more recent studies see Laruelle (1999); Wiederkehr (2007). For a review
of recent studies of Eurasianism see Glebov (2008).
angUniversity.ProducedanddistributedbyElsevierLimited.All rights reserved.
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vision both as an outcome of speciﬁc historical processes, in
particular due to the impact of the Mongol empire which
for the ﬁrst time united in one political entity the Eurasian
space, and as a locus of unique, autarkic development. This
autarkic development marked Eurasia as a space opposed
to the phenomena which the Eurasianists associated with
modern Europe, in particular to Europe’s ever increasing
individualistic and materialistic spirit. Not unlike their
predecessors in the 19th century, the Slavophiles, the Eur-
asianist thinkers saw Orthodox Christianity as a kernel of
Eurasia’s identity. They treated the Russian revolution as
a religiously meaningful historical transformation and
expected a religious revival among the Russians that would
help dislodge the Bolsheviks from power and establish
a truly Eurasian government (Glebov, 2003, pp. 293–337).3
Observers, back in the 1920s and now, often found Eur-
asianism bewildering. If the Eurasianist ideology repre-
sented an intellectual turn to Russia’s Asian connections,
then how could this turn be reconciled with a stress on
Orthodox religiosity socharacteristicofEurasianist thinkers?
If indeed, as Nikolai Trubetskoi suggested, “the elemental,
national uniqueness and the non-European, half-Asiatic face
of Russia–Eurasia was becoming more visible than ever” in
the wake of the Russian revolution, then how could the
Revolution “be overcome on the ﬁrm grounds of Orthodox
religiosity?” To answer these questions, I will argue below
that the Eurasianist movement offered its own vision of the
national mystique, which combined inﬂuences of Russian
ﬁn-de-siècle modernism, a proto-fascist search for the
regeneration of national life, and a peculiar interpretation of
Russian history in the wake of the empire’s dissolution.4 See a discussion of the wider Eurasianist circle in Glebov (2010a),
pp. 20–23.
5 Georgii Vasil’evich Florovskii (Georges Florovsky) took part in the ﬁrst
publications of the Eurasianists, yet he virtually ceased any cooperation
with the movement by the end of 1922. Throughout the 1920s, he was
excluded from the editorial and organizational decision making and was
associated with the movement by the public only due to his participation1. Exiles from the Silver Age: rhetoric of a new
generation
A reconstruction of the history of Eurasianism has to
begin with the life experiences of the movement’s
founders, who had barely entered their intellectual and
professional lives on the eve of the Revolution of 1917, in
the period that Catherine Evtuhov recently proposed to call
“Silver Age” by extending a term from literary history to the
whole range of phenomena characteristic of the last two
decades of imperial Russia (Evtuhov, 1997, pp. 1–17). Some
fundamental and deﬁning premises of the Eurasianist
movement – its disillusionment with liberal and progres-
sive politics of the Russian intelligentsia but also a critical
view of the religious renaissance of the 1900s – were
rooted in the experiences of a generation born into the
most “normal” period of imperial history. Religious
searches and the anti-bourgeois sentiment inherited from
that period were cast by the Eurasianist thinkers against
the background of disintegrating imperial state and society
in the revolution and the Civil War.
Between 1920 and 1928 (by the end of the latter year
the original movement disintegrated yet some elements of3 See interesting Correspondence between the Eurasianists regarding
their speciﬁc political plans to convert the Bolshevik leaders to Eura-
sianism in Glebov (2003).it lingered on throughout the 1930s), many individuals
were involved with the Eurasianist movement, ranging
from ultra-conservatives and even fascists to left-wing
scholars and writers. The scope of this essay does not
permit a thorough discussion of this wider circle and its
dynamics but wemay presume that Eurasianism did reﬂect
at least some concerns of the wider Russian émigré
community and reverberated with its political and cultural
dilemmas (Glebov, 2010a, pp. 20–23).4
Yet the core that led Eurasianism through the 1920s (the
period of the movement’s greatest cohesion and intellec-
tual productivity) consisted of four individuals: Nikolai
Sergeevich Trubetskoi, Petr Nikolaevich Savitskii, Petr
Petrovich Suvchinskii, and Petr Semenovich Arapov. While
others participated in the founding of the movement
and its ﬁrst publications – Prince A. A. Lieven and G. V.
Florovsky in particular – both quickly disappeared from
the network of correspondents who elaborated the Eura-
sianist ideology and pursued the editorial policies of Eur-
asianist publications in the 1920s (Blane, 1993, pp. 11–217;
Lloid, 1997, pp. 5–8).5 The four leading Eurasianists repre-
sented different intellectual and social milieus. N. S. Tru-
betskoi, eventually an outstanding linguist and a founder
of structural phonology, came from the Moscow family
of aristocrats and university professors. His father, Prince
S. N. Trubetskoi, rector of the Moscow University was
a well-known Christian philosopher and a follower of Vla-
dimir Solov’ev (Bohachevsky-Chomiak, 1976; Trubetskaia,
1953). His uncle, E. N. Trubetskoi, was also a philosopher-
and a university professor, and a leading ﬁgure of the pub-
lishing house “Put’”, which was at the center of attempts to
combine Christian philosophy, Orthodox tradition, conser-
vative liberalism and Russian nationalism (Gollerbakh,
2000; Poole, 2006, pp. 195–240).6 N. S. Trubetskoi was
called by a contemporary “an epigone of Moscow Slavo-
philes,” and, indeed, the aristocratic Slavophile tradition
was one of the deﬁning elements of Trubetskoi’s worldview
(Gollerbakh, 2000; Vetlugin, 1922, p. 45, pp. 4–5).
Petr Nikolaevich Savitskii, on the other hand, came from
themilieu of Russiﬁed Ukrainian gentry, the descendants of
the Cossack starshina of the 17th century. His father, Nikolai
Petrovich Savitskii, was the district Marshall of the Nobility,
the chair of zemstvo administration, and on the eve of the
revolution became a member of the State Council. P. N.
Savitskii was deeply interested in his Ukrainian heritage:
he began his publishing career with a book (co-edited with
V. L. Modzalevskii) on the monuments of Chernigov, his
native town in Ukraine. One of Savitskii’s nommes de plume
was Stepan Lubenskii, after his ancestor Stepan Savitskii,in the ﬁrst collections. On Florovsky’s life, see Blane (1993), pp. 11–217.
Prince Andrei Aleksandrovich Lieven helped organize the Eurasianist
group in 1920 but never took part in the movement’s further develop-
ment. On Lieven, see Lloid (1997), pp. 5–8.
6 On E. N. Trubetskoi see Gollerbakh (2000); Poole (2006).
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a student at the Polytechnic Institute in St Petersburg,
Savitskii became connected with Petr Berngardovich
Struve, scholar, journalist and politician who gradually
moved from Social Democracy and Marxism to liberalism
and, in the ﬁnal years of his life, in emigration, to conser-
vative monarchist liberalism. Struve’s work often focused
on economic and political aspects of the imperial state and
society in Russia, and Savitskii partook in this interest. His
pre-revolutionary publications dealt with economic
aspects of Russian imperial expansion (Glebov, 2005, pp.
299–329; Bystriukov, 2007).7
Petr Petrovich Suvchinskii hailed from Petrograd
(Bretanitskaia, 1999; Souvtchinski, 2006).8 He was born to
a Russiﬁed family of Polish nobles. His father was
a bureaucrat and a successful businessman, and his uncle
an active participant in conservative noble circles in the
Western gubernias. P. P. Suvchinskii studied at the cele-
brated Tenishev school in Petrograd, where he was taught
by Vladimir Gippius, a teacher of Osip Mandel’shtam and of
Vladimir Nabokov. Suvchinskii was musically inclined, and
took piano lessons from the legendary Feliks Mikhailovich
Bliumenfeld, a leading Russian musical pedagogue. As
a very young man, Suvchinskii used his family’s enormous
ﬁnancial resources to co-found Muzykal’nyi Sovreme-
mennik, a leading Russian music journal, with A.N. Rimskii-
Korsakov in 1916. After one year, Suvchinskii withdrew
from the journal citing Korsakov’s conservatism and lack of
interest in “new music” represented by Stravinskii and
Prokof’ev. In the following decades, Suvchinskii maintained
active correspondence with both composers and was
Stravinskii’s ghost-writer at least on one occasion. Suv-
chinskii was favorably mentioned by Alexander Blok,
whose ideas on the crisis of humanism became a starting
point for Suvchinskii’s own conceptualization of the
Russian Revolution. During the revolutionary turmoil,
Suvchinskii was the only Eurasianist who had any experi-
ence dealing with the new regime: he cooperated with
Artur Lur’e, a well-known futurist and composer, who
became the head of the Music Department of the People’s
Commissariat of Enlightenment (MuzO) (Glebov, 2006, pp.
163–223).9
The fourth leading Eurasianist, Petr Semenovich Ara-
pov, differed from the ﬁrst three in almost all respects. He
joined the movement in 1922, when the Eurasianist
conception had already taken its shape, and he was much
younger and less educated than the other three leaders.
While Arapov shared with his Eurasianist colleagues an
aristocratic pedigree, he was much younger. Unfortunately,
not much is known about him before his appearance in
the annals of Eurasianism. Some sources suggest he was
a graduate of Aleksandrovsky Lyceum, a prestigious school
in imperial Russia. He certainly served in the Cavalry
Guards regiment on the eve of the revolution and in the7 On Savitskii, see Glebov (2005); Bystriukov (2007).
8 Suvchinskii remains the least known ﬁgure among the Eurasianists,
despite several recent collections focusing on his life and writings:
Bretanitskaia (1999); Souvtchinski (2006).
9 On Suvchinskii’s life and modernist aesthetics see Glebov (2006).Volunteer Army during the Civil War. Savitskii later
mentioned that Arapov was psychologically unstable due
to his participation in mass executions while among the
Whites. Unlike his colleagues in the Eurasianist move-
ment, Arapov was not a proliﬁc writer. His main focus was
on the émigré politics as the Eurasianists attempted to
convert as many émigré youths as possible to its cause.
Arapov’s family relationship with General Wrangell and
his contacts among the White émigré military ofﬁcers
brought to Eurasianism a number of individuals from the
military circles. He was also central in helping Eurasianism
become mired in the web of underground links and
contacts organized by the Soviet secret services as the
latter created the sprawling fake monarchist organization
“Trest” to inﬁltrate the emigration.10 In fact, in all likeli-
hood, Arapov was an agent of the GPU as early as 1924
(Glebov, 2009, pp. 41–45).11
There can be little doubt that intellectually Eurasianism
was the brainchild of Trubetskoi, Savitskii, and Suvchinskii
(with Arapov joing the troika to shape the movement
politically), whose ideas and writings formed the contro-
versial canon of Eurasianism, and who edited contributions
by others. It is therefore important to understand the
background of the three leading Eurasianist ideologues and
explore their position vis-à-vis other intellectual trends in
late imperial Russia and among the émigrés. Although their
interests and biographies differed signiﬁcantly, the three
leading Eurasianists shared experiences that were forma-
tive for them as individuals and for the movement in
general.
The Eurasianist scholars were all born in the 1890s, and
matured when World War I already began. They belonged
to this unique generation of the Russian educated classes
who arrived on the scene signiﬁcantly different from that of
previous generations of the Russian intelligentsia. Politi-
cally, Russia already had a parliament, professional political
parties, and elections, however limited or ﬂawed these
institutions might have been. Intellectually, the famous
Vekhi debate signaled the end of the domination of the
intelligentsia proper with its revolutionary and socialist
sympathies (Kolerov, 2000; Read, 1979). The activities of
the Religious Philosophical Societies and other groups (like
the group around the publishing house Put’) provided space
for the development of philosophical thought heavily
inﬂuenced by neo-Kantian and neo-Platonic ideas, Chris-
tian theology, Orthodox tradition with its prominence of
patristic writings, and liberal nationalism. Leading intel-
lectuals were no longer social outcasts from their own
estates, as were, for example, Alexander Herzen or Mikhail
Bakunin. Rather, they were established professionals with
university chairs or seats in the Duma or even in the more
conservative State Council. Similarly, in the realm of liter-
ature and arts the efﬂorescence of high culture known as
the Silver Age provided for an unprecedented diversiﬁca-
tion of cultural life. Again, social concerns of the intelli-
gentsia, while they did not disappear altogether, ceased to
dominate the cultural scene. Modernist critique of10 On Trest, see.
11 For information on Arapov, see Glebov (2009), p. 41, pp. 41–45.
S. Glebov / Journal of Eurasian Studies 2 (2011) 103–114106contemporary civilization became more subtle, abstract,
and spiritual. Often, as was the case of Alexander Blok, it
focused on the ever-spreading “meshchanstvo”, petty-
bourgeois philistine conformism, and in the period of crises
sought to identify forces that could destroy the standard-
izing work of themodern European civilization. Such forces
were often seen in “Asia,” which came to signify the
“elements” of the Russian people untouched by modern
European inﬂuences. Thus, a modernist “obsession with
Asia” had a political meaning (Nivat, 1965, p. 460).
The founders of the Eurasianist movement matured in
this period and were socialized successfully into its various
milieus. N. S. Trubetskoi, awunderkind, began publishing on
folklore when he was 14, passed his magisterial exams in
the spring of 1916 and became a privat-dotsent at Moscow
University teaching Sanskrit. By 1917 he was ﬁrmly on the
path of a very successful academic career (Antoschenko,
1998; Chizhevsky, 1939; Gumilev, 1995; Kleiner, 1985;
Kochergina, 1998; Kondrashov, 1990; Kretschmer, 1939;
Liberman, 1991; Neroznak, 1990; Nikishenkov, 1992;
Poljakov and Trubetzkoy, 2005; Riasanovsky, 1964;
Sobolev, 1991; Tolstoy, 1995; Toporov, 1990, 1991;
Trubetzkoy, 1982; Wytrzens, 1964; Zhuravlev, 1990).12 P.
N. Savitskii entered the diplomatic service and was posted
in Norway, while continuing his research into political
economy and publications in P. B. Struve’s Russkaia Mysl’.
Suvchinskii, apart from founding Muzykal’nyi Sovremennik,
maintained a peasant choir in his estate near Kiev and
studied, following Kastal’skii, folk music, as well as
produced a libretto for Derzhanovsky’s planned opera. The
Revolution and the following Civil War shattered their lives
and sent them on different paths to exile.
Trubetskoi left Moscow in the fall of 1917 for Kislovodsk
in the south and never returned to Moscow. He brieﬂy
taught at the Don University in Rostov, wandered in the
cities of the Caucasus, and in December 1919 he left Rostov
for Yalta in the Crimea, fromwhere in February 1920 hewas
evacuated to Constantinople (or, rather, to the Russian
refugee colony on the Prince’s Islands). He remained there
until June 1920, when he was hired by the University of
Soﬁa in Bulgaria to teach Slavic languages. P. Savitskii also
was in the South: in 1918–1919, he spent time at his estate
near Chernigov, and then wandered in Odessa, Rostov, and
the Crimea. He often fought in different White armies until
becoming an assistant to his former teacher, P. B. Struve, at
the time a “foreign minister” of the Crimean government of
General Wrangell. Suvchinskii attempted to work with the
new power in Petrograd together with Artur Lur’e, plan-
ning an overhaul of music theatres and launching a new
musical publication, Melos, but left the city in the fall of
1918 and arrived in Kiev. Having spent almost a year there,12 What follows is not a complete list of works on Trubetskoi and it can
attest to the emergence of a virtual cult of Trubetskoi in today’s Russian
humanities. Chizhevsky (1939); Kretschmer (1939); Riasanovsky (1964);
Wytrzens (1964); Trubetzkoy (1982); Kleiner (1985); Toporov (1990,
1991); Kondrashov (1990); Zhuravlev (1990); Neroznak (1990); Sobolev
(1991); Liberman (1991); Nikishenkov (1992); Tolstoy (1995); Gumilev
(1995); Kochergina (1998); Antoschenko (1998); Poljakov and
Trubetzkoy (2005).Suvchinskii went to the Crimea, from which he was evac-
uated to Soﬁa in Bulgaria.
1.1. Through the shattered empire
These paths to exile ran through the borderlands of the
shattered empire, and the future founders of the Eura-
sianist movement had a chance to observe its disintegra-
tion. In a letter to Roman Jakobson Trubetskoi recalled that
“during my wanderings in the Caucasus I once came to
Baku in March 1918, exactly during the ‘Muslim uprising
against the Soviet power,’ or, more precisely, during this
short period of time when the Armenians were slaughter-
ing the Tatars (Jakobson, 1985b, p. 4)’. Interethnic conﬂicts
in the Caucasus, similar to the “March Days” in Baku in
1918, to which Trubetskoi was a witness, undoubtedly
colored his perception of the nationalist movements in the
former Russian empire (Suny, 1972, pp. 214–233).13 On the
other hand, Trubetskoi, like many other participants and
witnesses of the Civil War in the South of Russia, recog-
nized the importance of the “borderland” or colonial
peoples and took note of their “entrance onto world stage
(Riasanovsky,1972b, p. 5).” Similarly, Savitskii described his
Civil War experiences, which combined wounded national
pride, disillusionment with the White cause, and aware-
ness of the empire’s fragility:
I saw the regime of the Central Rada; during three
months by the force of word and the force of arms
together with my friends-ofﬁcers I had been defending
my Chernigov estate from the Bolshevik gangs; I was
liberated from this siege by the Germans and was
a witness to their seven months long regime; as a subal-
tern I fought in the ranks of the Russian Corps, which
defendedKiev fromPetliura and I lived through the fall of
the city; together with my father I ﬂed – or left, who can
tell? – the city of Kiev; I saw and touched the French in
Odessa andwaited long enough to see the “glorious” end
of pccupation française. FromMarch 1919 to August I was
in Ekaterinodar; from August to November I was ﬂoun-
dering in thewhirls of the Russian “White Sovdepia,” the
Russian South, which was just liberated from the
Bolsheviks. I spent several weeks at the frontline and I
lived in the cities and villages of Kharkov and Poltava.
Then I moved to Rostov.(Savitskii, 1920)
When the eventual founders of the Eurasianist move-
ment arrived in Soﬁa in 1920, they came fresh from expe-
riencing the disintegration of the Russian empire along the
social and ethnic lines. The very geography of the passage
to exile led them through the Southern ﬂanks of the former
imperial state, where White Generals attempted to gather
support for the anti-Bolshevik cause against the back-
ground of the ever increasing fragmentation and the rise of13 Immediately following the events the Baku Soviet tended to repre-
sent them as a “Muslim uprising against the Soviet power,” a view shared
by the USSR historical profession. Publicists in the Russian emigration as
well as Western scholars tended to emphasize the nationalist and ethnic
component of these events, where leading Armenian and Muslim parties,
including the Dashnaktsutiun and the Musawat parties, clashed. See Suny
(1972).
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scholars had known from their cabinet studies that Russia
was an empire, a state with multiple territories, pop-
ulations and languages that drastically differed from each
other. Their ﬂight from the capitals into exile across the
disintegrating Russia provided them with a unique expe-
rience of observing the imperial fabrics being torn by
contemporary social and political forces. This process was
far removed from the imaginary binary opposition between
Reds and Whites as it revealed multiple and conﬂicting
forces and interests at different fronts of the Civil War in
Moscow and St Petersburg, Ukraine, the Caucasus, the Don
Cossack region or the New Russia and Crimea. It is not
surprising that the Eurasianist scholars’ primary interest
was in a vision of Russia as a cultural and political unity in
the form of the Eurasian utopia.16 Trubetskoi (1926). Lev Platonovich Karsavin, who joined the move-
ment in 1926 despite Trubetskoi’s and Savitskii’s opposition, had an
established pre-Revolutionary reputation as a philosopher and medie-
valist. At the same time, he was a participant to the “religious and phil-
osophical Renaissance” of the 1900s, and Trubetskoi objected to
Karsavin’s less than puritanical lifestyle.
17 On the expulsion of 1922, see Finkel (2003).
18 P. P. Suvchinskii to N. S. Trubetskoi. November 25, 1922. Quoted from
Rossiiskii Arkhiv (1994).
19 The Eurasianist Correspondence demonstrates that these annual
publications (Evraziiskie Vremenniki) were treated by the leaders of the1.2. The rhetoric of a new generation
They also came to exile pondering the question of the
meaning of the Revolution, and the role of the Russian
cultural elite in bringing it about. The catastrophe begged
for explanations, and, although each of the Eurasianists
sought answers in their own ﬁelds of expertise, they shared
some fundamental attitudes that laid the ground for an
intellectual movement. In fact, the Eurasianist thinkers saw
their consensus as a distinguishing feature of their own
movement: as Trubetskoi reminded Suvchinskii during
a crisis of Eurasianism in the late 1920s, “we never dis-
agreed on important issues – remember? – and always
thought that this was our distinct characteristic (Glebov,
2010b, P. 326).”14
This consensus rested on the shared attitude to the
previous generation of Russian intellectual leaders, the
generation of the Vekhi debate and of the Put’ publishing
house. This generation included the Eurasianists’ intellectual
fathers: P.B. Struve, the Trubetskoi brothers (Sergei, Evgenii
andGrigorii), N. A. Berdiaev, S. N. Bulgakov, andmanyothers.
Often, these intellectuals with liberal inclinations were the
Eurasianists’ fathers sensu stricto. Savitskii’s father was
known in the zemstvo movement for his liberal views
(Kurlov, 1992, chap. XVI).15 D. P. Sviatopolk-Mirsky was the
son of a high-ranking bureaucrat, yet Sviatopolk-Mirsky’s
term as the Minister of the Interior was marked by “liberal”
attitudes. Sergei Nikolaevich Trubetskoi, N. S. Trubetskoi’s
father (as well as his uncles), was a well-known ﬁgure
among the moderate liberals. Despite the fact that many
Eurasianists were connected to this generation of the fathers
in a myriad of ways, their attitude to it was militant and
aggressive. The Eurasianists reserved their harshest judg-
ments for this group and it was against this group that they
chose to deﬁne their own identity as a generation.
Throughout the 1920s the Eurasianists repeatedly criti-
cized those intellectuals who participated in the philo-
sophical and religious “Renaissance” of the 1910s. Discussing
the personality of Nikolai Aleksandrovich Berdiaev,14 Cited from Glebov (2010b), p. 326, p. 326.
15 Savitskii’s father’s liberalism is mentioned in the memoirs by Kurlov
(1992), Ch. XVI.Trubetskoi disapprovingly wrote about him to Petr Suv-
chinskii in January 1923: “I knowBerdiaev. He appears tome
ﬁrst of all as a light-minded person. A while ago he told me
that Christianity is outdated and needs a female deity.”
(Trubetskoi, 1923). When in 1926 the Eurasianists discussed
thepossible participation of the philosopher LevPlatonovich
Karsavin in themovement, Trubetskoi reminded Suvchinskii
of “our old rule not to accept anyone of the previous
generation” (Trubetskoi, 1926).16 In the same letter Tru-
betskoi criticized his own uncle, Prince Grigorii Nikolaevich
Trubetskoi, for his lack of resolve and told Suvchinskii that
“indecisiveness is characteristic of this entire generation”
(Trubetskoi, 1926). Grigorii Nikolaevich, a well-known
diplomat, was a conservative liberal and a participant in the
religious and philosophical “renaissance” of the 1910s.
In 1922 a group of outstanding intellectuals – all of
whom were prominent before the revolution – was exiled
from Russia on the orders of Lenin (Finkel, 2003).17 Petr
Suvchinskii from Berlin communicated to Trubetskoi his
feelings about these exiles:
I endure the arrival of these exiles as the greatest
disaster. When the ﬁrst group arrived (Berdiaev, Frank,
Il’in), it had some individual selection of personalities.
This time it is simply as if they transplanted a piece of
turf from one cemetery into another, it looks like a piece
of dead skin. They transplanted a completely outlived
layer of culture from Russia to Berlin, and for what? Of
course in order to lead the emigration and speak on its
behalf and, therefore, to stiﬂe everything which is new
and vital and therefore dangerous for the Bolsheviks.
Lenin who speaks and acts on behalf of Russia has
nothing to do with it. But this intelligentsia, which is of
course exiled by Lenin on purpose, does not represent
anything anymore and will just compromise the new
émigré generations (Rossiiskii Arkhiv, 1994).18
In 1924 the Eurasianists decided to explain their critique
of the older generation of religious philosophers. In
a programmatic article published in the Eurasianist annual
almanac, Petr Suvchinskii wrote about the “religious and
philosophical renaissance” of the 1910s19:
“Nihilist moralism” and militant materialism [of the
intelligentsia] were condemned and instead of these
two, to use the Vekhi formulae, we heard appeals to
embrace “concrete idealism” and “religious humanism.”movement as their ofﬁcial tribune. All articles published there had to
receive approval of the “editorial troika”, which consisted of N. S. Tru-
betskoi, P. N. Savitskii and P. P. Suvchinskii. It is, therefore, safe to assume
that the leaders of the movement subscribed to the ideas expressed in
these articles.
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direction might appear, it could not actually have an
impact on the broad course of events. Despite the
“renovated ideals” the second revolution has erupted
and has been going under the fanatic leadership of the
outlived principles of militant materialism. Unfortu-
nately, the religious, intellectual and political “renais-
sance” of the 1890s and the 1900s was not directed
toward a broad all-national work. It did not become the
assignment of the epoch (zadachei epokhi) and it
appeared meaningful and signiﬁcant only in the limited
milieu of the intelligentsia, which was undergoing its
internal crisis . (Suvchinskii, 1925)
In the Eurasianists’ vision of the pre-revolutionary
decade, the ocean of the elemental forces of themasses was
deeply alienated from the educated classes, the intelli-
gentsia, which was culturally foreign to themasses and was
concentrated on its own petty problems. Incapable of
transgressing its own narrow horizons determined by the
artiﬁcial European civilization, the intelligentsia failed to
bridge this gap and to propose a national vision for Russia.
The Eurasianists may have shared with the philosophers of
the 1900s–1910s their interest in Orthodoxy and their
search for a moral regeneration of society on the principles
of Christianity and nationalism. However, they presented
themselves as a new generation that was free of indeci-
siveness and lack of will, which they deemed to be a char-
acteristic of the Russian elite in the decade preceding the
revolution. Pushing this rhetoric even further, the Eura-
sianists began to use anti-intellectualist tropes usually
associated with fascist movements in interwar Europe. In
a letter to a younger participant in the Eurasianist move-
ment, Petr Savitskii outlined his vision of the generational
difference between the Eurasianists and the “Sophians,”
members of the “Brotherhood of St. Sophia”, a religious
group of intellectuals restored in emigration by S. N.
Bulgakov (Evtuhov, 1997, pp. 1–17; Kolerov, 1994)20:
They (the Sophians) sense a different nature of will in us.
Compared to previous generations, the Eurasianists are
a new type of men due to their spiritual constitution and
their societal actions. Berdiaev.used to acknowledge
that. They are corrupted by reﬂection.We, for better or for
worse, are alien to this debilitating reﬂection. In that
sense, G. V. Florovsky belongs more to them than to us. I
have said this about father Sergii (Bulgakov) but the same
can be said about N. A. Berdiaev, perhaps in a different
form. Nevertheless, in A. V. Kartashev the above-
mentioned nature is combined with something else,
which makes him closer to us than to them.(Savitskii,
1924)20 In 1923–1924 the Eurasianists were embroiled in a conﬂict with
Sergei Bulgakov and members of his Brotherhood of St Soﬁa. Bulgakov
initially invited the Eurasianists to take part but his invitation was
declined by the Eurasianists, who saw in this initiative a continuation of
“degenerate” traditions of the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia. Moreover,
the Eurasianists thought of Bulgakov’s initiative as a submission to
Catholic inﬂuences (since the brotherhood reminded them of a Catholic
order). On the development of this conﬂict see Kolerov (1994). On
Bulgakov, see Evtuhov, 1997, pp. 1–17.Anton Vladimirovich Kartashev, a Church historian and
the minister of confessions in the Provisional Government,
was a member of the Kadet party and an associate of Petr
Struve in emigration. Due to his age and his prominence
before the Bolshevik takeover, he belonged to the older
generation of émigrés. In 1921–1926 he was involved in an
attempt to forge a united émigré anti-Bolshevik front and
developed his own vision of Russian national unity which
was centered on the military brotherhood. The epitome of
this brotherhood was the experience of theWhite troops in
evacuation camps in the Balkans. In 1920–1921 Kartashev
toured Russian émigré locations to lecture on his nationalist
ideas, which ﬁtted very well with the fascist ideologies of
interwar Europe (Samover, 1998, pp. 334–396).21 This
hunger for action and this imagery of national unity prop-
agated by Kartashev made him into a ﬁgure more accept-
able for the Eurasianists, who sought new ideological forms.
Nikolai Aleksandrovich Berdiaev, indeed, acknowledged
the novelty of the Eurasianist mood. In his review of Eur-
asianist publications he wrote about the movement:
Eurasianism is ﬁrst of all an emotional, not an intellec-
tual movement. Its emotion is a reaction of creative
national and religious instincts to the catastrophe we
endured. This kind of spiritual formation can turn into
Russian Fascism. (Berdiaev, 1925, p. 101)
Berdiaev accepted the Eurasianists’ claim to be a new
generation yet he reserved some critical remarks for them.
He thought that they were, indeed, “a new generation that
grew up during the war and the revolution. This generation
does not feel itself related to our religious generation and
does not want to carry on our legacy. It is inclined to refute
all that is connected to the problem of new religious
consciousness. Its will is directed towards simpliﬁcation,
elementization, towards everyday life forms of Orthodoxy.
Its will is directed toward traditionalism and it is afraid of
and suspicious of any religious creativity” (Berdiaev, 1925,
p. 101).
The Eurasianist’s generational rhetoric presupposed
a division in the succession of the Russian intellectual and
cultural elite. On the one side of this division were the
Eurasianists, the ﬁrst post-Revolutionary thinkers who
offered a distinctly illiberal and ﬁercely nationalist vision
of “overcoming” the Revolution. On the other side were
the intellectuals of the older generation, whom the Eur-
asianists accused of inaction, indecisiveness, and, ulti-
mately, of having missed an opportunity to translate the
religious renaissance of the 1900s into a viable nationalist
program.
2. Revolution as revelation: every day life confession
of faith
As all Eurasianists agreed, the Revolution was not just
a social turmoil but a profound spiritual upheaval. To
interpret it the Eurasianist thinkers drew on the cultural
fermentation of the last pre-revolutionary decade with its21 On the proto-Fascist ideology of Kartashev see Samover (1998),
pp. 334–396.
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European modernity, fascination with the Asian connec-
tions of Russia’s past, and religious revival. The central
ﬁgure of the Silver Age as interpreted by the Eurasianists
was, undoubtedly, Alexander Blok. In 1920, an edition of
Alexander Blok’s poem The Twelve with Suvchinskii’s fore-
word was published.22 In the publication, Suvchinskii
suggested that the new generation of the Russian intelli-
gentsia would be able to understand and accept the Revo-
lution only “when it comes as close to the Revolution as
Blok did and would listen to it as Blok did (Suvchinskii,
1920, p. 12).” In a programmatic article in the Eurasianist
almanac Suvchinskii emphasized the importance of Blok
for the Eurasianists’ own “perception of times (Suvchinskii,
1922a, pp. 147–176).”
For one, the Eurasianists shared Blok’s fascination with
the “elemental forces” of themasses. In 1908 Blok wrote his
famous cycle of poems “On the Kulikovo Battleﬁeld”
inspired by the struggle of the Muscovite forces against the
Tatars in 1380. Referring to Blok’s celebration of the steppe
mare, ﬂying in the great Asian spaces of Russia, Suvchinskii
argued that Blok “already sensed these elements – this
wind – which later, in his poem The Twelve, will have
embraced the entire “God’s world” (Suvchinskii, 1922a,
p. 171)”. Blok in 1908 delivered his presentation under the
title “The People and the Intelligentsia,” read by the author
in the Religious and Philosophic Society, and reprinted in
the Socialist Revolutionary press in 1918, in which he
lamented the divisions between the people and the
educated classes and pondered themetaphor of Gogol, who
represented Russia as a troika ﬂying in an unknown
direction. What, Blok asked, if the noise that we are hearing
is the sound of that troika’s bell, and what if “the troika is
ﬂying right into us?” Seeking truth with the people, the
intelligentsia is throwing itself under the horses of the
troika (Blok, 1918a, pp. 91–92).
In the essay “Elements and culture” Blok again returned
to the issue of the upcoming catastrophe and compared it
to the earthquake that destroyed Calabria and Messina. In
a dramatic and unprecedented way Blok proclaimed that
the Russian intelligentsia found itself caught between the
vengeance of Culture, which appeared in the form of steel
bayonets andmachines and the vengeance of the elements,
the rising masses of the people.23 Suvchinskii took a note of
Blok’s vision, reminding his own readers that Blok “spoke
of the vengeance of the elements against the laboratory-
like human culture of steel and concrete (Suvchinskii,
1922a, P. 170)”.
Blok’s vision of the great clash between the educated
classes and the people was profoundly pessimistic with
respect to the intelligentsia’s destiny: Blok saw no signs of
will for life in the “degenerate” intelligentsia and in the
“civilization in general.” In the arrival of the masses,22 The publication came out in the Russian-Bulgarian Publishing House,
which Suvchinskii founded in Soﬁa together with N. S. Zhekulin, a well-
known journalist from Kiev, and R. G. Mollov, a Bulgarian who made
a career in the Russian imperial service Apart from publishing the ﬁrst
Eurasianist texts, the Russian-Bulgarian Publishing House was also
charged with the production of P. B. Struve’s journal Russkaia Mysl’.
23 A. Blok, Stikhia i kul’tura//Sochineniia. pp. 92–101.though, Blok sensed a new creative force that will trans-
form human experience and help the rebirth of culture as
opposed to soulless civilization.
When the revolutionary events broke out, Blok
produced his famous poem The Twelve, the interpretation
of which scholars still debate even today (Schapiro, 1986).
He also published an essay under the title “The Intelli-
gentsia and the Revolution,” to the ideas of which the
Eurasianists would have fully subscribed. Brieﬂy, Blok’s
essay appealed to the educated classes to “listen to the
music of the revolution” and embrace it as a means to
destroy the world of the philistine bourgeois. As Blok
suggested, “the bourgeois has ﬁrm ground under his feet, as
the pig has its manure. He has family, capital, the service
position, decorations, and rank, God on the icon and the
Tsar on the throne. Take all this away from him and
everything will collapse (Blok, 1918b).” Blok celebrated that
collapse and hoped that it will help to free the way for what
he called “music,” the elemental powers of creativity
hidden in the masses, connected in his imagination with
the elemental powers of the social revolution: “All that
which was the object of veneration by the civilization, all
these cathedrals of Rheims, all these Messinas, all these
ancient estates [of Russia], all this will vanish without
a sign. Undoubtedly, there will remain just one thing that
was persecuted and chased away by the civilization: the
spirit of music (Blok, 1918b).”
Blok represented a well-known feature of European
modernismwith its distaste for bourgeois conformism and
standardization. What was unusual about Blok in European
context was his “geocultural” interpretation of the
elemental forces of the Revolution as “Asian.” For Blok, the
Russian masses were “Scythians”, and their barbaric
freshness contained the promise that European bourgeois
conformism will be swiped away from Russia in the revo-
lutionary eruption. Eurasianism accepted Blok’s criticism of
European civilization and the notion of Russia’s “Asian”
potential. Even Nikolai Trubetskoi, ever suspicious of
modernist experimentations, wrote to Roman Jakobson in
1922 that he sensed a mood conducive to Eurasianism in
the writings of Blok (Jakobson, 1985a, p. 15).
Still, the Eurasianists also had reservations about Blok’s
ideas. As Suvchinskii put it, “Blok remained until the end in
the stormy twilight and he did not reach out to the dawn.
He remained deaf to music. He thought he was listening to
music but in fact he heard only.the noise of chaos
(Suvchinskii, 1922a, p. 174).” For Suvchinskii, Blok remained
a thinker who was capable of conveying the feeling yet
failed to get across the formula. It was up to the Eurasianists
to ﬁnd these ideological formulae to approach the prob-
lems raised by Blok: the feeling of disillusionment in the
European civilization, the sense of the elemental powers of
the Russian revolution, and the promise of renovation that
they brought with them.
The Eurasianist thinkers cast their own response to the
Revolution in religious terms. To be sure, they were not
professional theologians, and when they ventured into
discourses on faith, their writings were no match to that of
their critics. Such philosophers and theologians as N. A.
Berdiaev and S. N. Bulgakov stood in this respect far above
the Eurasianist modest attempts to invoke religion.
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Eurasianist response to Russian modernism’s criticism of
the modern civilization were inspired by the Russian phil-
osophical tradition. Nineteenth-century Russian philoso-
phers, Vladimir Solov’ev and Nikolai Fedorov in particular,
were concerned with the Orthodox concept of theosis, the
transformation of the person into the likeness to God
(Valliere, 2000).24 In the Russian tradition, the concept was
often referred to as obozhestvlenie, the extension of God’s
realm into the world of human. Theosis stood for the deeply
religious, Christian transformation of all aspects of human
life. In Nikolai Fedorov’s philosophy, this interest in theosis
led to the elaboration of a philosophical conception of the
“commoncause,”with the latter referring to theovercoming
of deathby theunited forcesof Christianhumanity (Fedorov,
1983;Hagemeister,1989).25 As Irina Papernodemonstrated,
philosophical concerns of Solov’ev and Fedorov played
a profoundly important role in the cultural strategies of
Russian modernism. Late imperial artists and writers
engaged in a range of activities meant to “create life” by
eliminating the boundaries between everyday life and art
(Masing-Delic, 1992; Paperno, 1994, pp. 1–12).26 Similarly,
the Eurasianist interpretation of this philosophical tradition
focused on the construction of a new society permeated by
the totalizing spirit of Orthodox spirituality. In such
a society, the boundaries between the domain of faith and
the domain of everyday life were to be overcome, and
a universal “psychological order” had to become a principle
of the Russian national life.
The leading Eurasianist thinker who undertook the
work of elaborating Eurasianist response to the Revolution
by drawing on the modernist cultural fermentation was
Petr Suvchinskii. Drawing on Bergson’s philosophy of
intuition and time (the inﬂuence was never admitted),
Suvchinskii argued that the Russian revolution was an
elemental event, and therefore it was futile to seek the
guilty ones and to resist it. People can complain about
elemental events, they can resist them, but most people
instinctively choose to accept such events as something
beyond their control (Suvchinskii, 1922b, pp. 99–102). The
Revolution was a profoundly signiﬁcant event, and such
events have the potential to unite people and imbue them
with a new spirit of unity:
An event is just some form,which is registered by human
psyche. There are formless epochs, epochs of formless
human being, poor in real events, but there are also
inspired and engraved epochs, when every day and every
hour bring with them changes of life activities, ferments
of the heroic and eventful principles. Events always
organize andunite humanity. The absence of events gives
birth to psychological ﬂabbiness, which breeds divisive-
ness. Instead of an organized psychological order there24 See Valliere (2000). Esp. pp. 160–162 for a discussion of Soloviev’s
interpretation of theosis as opening the way for Orthodox encounter with
the modern civilization.
25 Fedorov (1983). On Fedorov, see Hagemeister (1989).
26 On Fedorov’s inﬂuence on the Silver Age see Masing-Delic (1992);
Paperno (1994). See also Paperno’s contribution in that volume under
the title The Meaning of Art: Symbolist Theories. Pp. 13–23.emerge individual, divided moods, contradictory and
egocentric worldviews. (Suvchinskii, 1922b, p. 102)
Suvchinskii believed that this immediate psychological
response to grandiose historical transformations must be
opposed to “dead” historical analysis which sees every
event as part of a logical and rational process understood by
economists and sociologists. For Suvchinskii, this imme-
diate psychological response is the only one that has the
potential to open “the great revelations of spirit. It is the
most precious of all that any contemporary can possess”
(Suvchinskii, 1922b, p. 102). On the contrary, a historical
analysis deprived of that immediacy of experience does not
allow people to understand “those changes and breaks of
the main order of human psyche, which occurred in our
own days” (Suvchinskii, 1922b, p. 103).
Arguing the religious nature of the Russian revolution as
a period of spiritual unraveling, Suvchinskii wrote:
No, this is not a metaphor: one needs to believe that
there are times when Heaven is given to humans, when
it opens for the blind in convulsions of its deepest forces,
in the saturation of its profound being, and then the
humanity catches the ﬂight of the stars, the humanity
understands the order and the choir of the earth, and
gives to its coming descendants its visions and
dreams. But the link closes and the time ends, the
skies ﬂy away from the earth again and appear empty,
and for the new generations these visions and dreams
seem to be alien and wild.(Suvchinskii, 1922b, p. 107)
For Suvchinskii, the Russian pre-Revolutionary intelli-
gentsia was exactly the generation that lived during the
times when “the sky ﬂew far away from earth”. As Suv-
chinskii put it, “the upper layers of [Russian culture before
the Revolution] ﬂew upwards, into the empty and dull
skies, and closed themselves in “pure” spirituality”
(Suvchinskii, 1922b, p. 110). Spirit without the ﬂesh
becomes a ghost, Suvchinskii argued, and this was the fate
of the Russian modernist culture. Its fascination with
Symbolism was for Suvchinskii a sign of loosing ﬁrm
grounds in the sense of reality (Suvchinskii, 1922b, p. 111).
For Suvchinskii, Russian Symbolism and its interest in
“false mysticism” were all omens of how abstract and
rationalistic Russian pre-revolutionary culture had become.
His own alternative suggested a holistic vision of life
imbued with religious meaning and practice:
Only in a combination of mysticism and realism in one
organic whole, only in real religious culture, that is, in
a mystic revival of the multiplicity of life experiences
and in re-concretization of abstract mysticism is the
salvation and the exit from the dead-end of modern
cultural and spiritual consciousness, which is torn into
pieces, divided, and lost. (Suvchinskii, 1922b, p. 112)
But if modern consciousness, traumatized by loss of
coherence and misled by rationalistic interpretations of
reality, had to ﬁnd its salvation in the transgression of
boundaries between the realms of “realism” understood as
immediate life experiences and their interpretations, and of
“mysticism”, which for Suvchinskii meant religiosity, then
what were the signs that such salvation was possible?
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path for spiritual regeneration? What should this “real
religious culture” entail? How could it be achieved, and
where could it seek historical inspirations? Here, Berdiaev’s
observation regarding “everyday life forms” of religiosity in
Eurasianism was extremely well taken. The Eurasianist
thinkers – led by Petr Suvchinskii in this instance – imag-
ined such new religious culture in terms of “bytovoe ispo-
vednichestvo” (everyday life confession of faith).
Suvchinskii believed that religious mysticism should
penetrate everyday life of Russians and that the Russian
revolution opened the possibility for such a fusion. The
historical precedent for an era colored by “bytovoe ispo-
vednichestvo”was located by the Eurasianist thinkers in the
experiences of Slavic principalities in the wake of the
Mongol invasion.
3. The Mongols as Bolsheviks: in search for an ideal
past
The Eurasianists’ critique of the pre-revolutionary
period of Russian culture and their search for a new reli-
giously inspired national mystique found a remarkable
parallel in the view of Russian history that the movement
came to expose. This view, as is well known, privileged
Russia’s Asian connections. However, the Eurasianist
attention to Asian inﬂuences in Russia’s past were inspired
not just by a desire to salvage the former imperial space
from the centrifugal forces of minority nationalisms by
endowing the empire with a cultural content of the
Eurasian civilization. The Eurasianist thinkers utilized their
scandalous at the time re-invention of Russian Empire as an
heir to the nomadic empires of the East to sustain their
vision of a totalizing national spirit born out of humiliation
and devastation. In the Eurasianist strategy, this totalizing
national spirit provided hope for a non-Communist trans-
formation of Russia in the wake of the Bolsheviks’ collapse.
In 1923–1924, Nikolai Trubetskoi elaborated some of
the key postulates of Eurasianism with regard to Russian
history, which resulted in the publication of several articles
and brochures. Even for the general public, his new account
of Russian history was quite shocking. Even if prior to 1917
one of the leading Russian historians, Aleksandr Evgen’e-
vich Presniakov, admitted that it was impossible to deﬁne
to which nation the Kievan Rus’ belonged, Russia or
Ukraine, Trubetskoi’s new idea that there was virtually
nothing in common between Kiev and Moscow was very
radical (Presniakov, 1938, pp. 1–11). Trubetskoi argued that
Kievan Russia occupied a territory different from the
territory of Russia as a whole: “that state, or rather that
group of more or less independent principalities subsumed
by the name Kievan Rus’ in no way corresponds to the
Russian state which we presently consider our motherland
(Trubetskoi, 1925; Trubetskoi, 1991, p. 161).27.”
In part, Trubetskoi’s dismissal of the Kievan period was
geopolitical and imperial. Kievan Rus’ occupied just one
part of the Russian imperial space. According to27 Trubetskoi (1925). Here and after quoted from the English translation
Trubetskoi (1991).Trubetskoi, this medieval Slavic principality based on the
Dnepr river basinwas doomed. It was surrounded by more
powerful and economically more viable neighbors, such as
the Khazars in the lower Volga (the self-defeating nature
of his example, apparently escaped Trubetskoi: in fact, the
Khazar state fell because of the attacks by Kievan Rus’
princes!). Kievan Rus’ could not extend its territory and
was open to attack from the steppe. The only outlet for
Kievan energies was in the internal strife, which proved
fatal when the Mongols arrived. Therefore, as Trubetskoi
suggested, Russian historians were wrong to assign Kievan
Rus’ to the position of the ancestor of modern Russian
statehood.
What was, then, the historical precedent for the state
that Trubetskoi “considered his motherland”? As he sug-
gested, “a glance at a historical map reveals that at one time
almost all the territory of the present day USSR constituted
a part of the Mongolian empire founded by the Great Gen-
ghis-Khan” (Trubetskoi, 1991, p. 163).” Correspondingly,
Trubetskoi proposed to consider the empire of the Mongols
as the predecessor of the Russian state, and not the princi-
palities of the Kievan period. The core of theMongol empire
was formed by the geographical system of the steppe and
the rivers. This system covered Eurasia, the separate conti-
nent on the landmass of the Old World, and its population
represented a gradual transition fromtheBuriat–Mongolian
race in the east, through the Finnish and Turkic tribes in the
Volga basin, to the Slavs in the west. Trubetskoi’s favorite
metaphor to describe that transition was “rainbow”. The
integrity of the ethnographic rainbow was determined by
the geographic systemic factors. As Trubetskoi put it, “by its
very nature, Eurasia is historically predestined to comprise
a single state entity (Trubetskoi, 1991, pp. 164–165).” The
importance of Genghis-Khan in Eurasian history was
underscored by the fact that he fulﬁlled the uniﬁcation of
Eurasia, and since “Eurasia is geographically, ethnographi-
cally, and economically an integrated system, its political
uniﬁcation was historically inevitable (Trubetskoi, 1991, p.
167).” Thus, for Trubetskoi, Genghis-Khan was of profound
historical importance because his actions hadhelped realize
the “systemic” nature of the Eurasian continent in the form
of a single state.
But Genghis-Khan was important not just because he
united the entire Eurasian continent. The great Mongol
warrior, according to Trubetskoi’s reconstruction, professed
ideas that corresponded to what the Eurasianists called
“ideocracy”: the rule of a powerful idea that transcended
particular realms of culture, scholarship, religion, or poli-
tics. For Genghis-Khan, according to Trubetskoi, such idea
was in the absolute superhuman law, to which he himself
and his entire realm were made subject. Genghis-Khan
selected his associates from those people who understood
these great principles andwho valued their honor and their
principles more than life itself. Generally, Genghis-Khan
despised representatives of settled societies as people
corrupt bymaterial interest; he preferred nomads, who had
little attachment to material goods. Correspondingly,
Genghis-Khan valued deeply religious people, for whom
earthly comfort was of minor importance. According to
“Genghis-Khan’s state ideology,” “the power of the ruler
must rest not upon some ruling class, estate, nation, or
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type (Trubetskoi, 1991, p. 174).
It is revealing that Trubetskoi wrote the brochure The
Legacy of Chingis-Khan speciﬁcally for the Soviet audience.
As his correspondence with Suvchinskii, whowas in charge
of Eurasianist publications, demonstrated, the brochure
was distributed on the émigré market against Trubetskoi’s
clearly expressed wishes. He was aware of the intellectual
weaknesses of his constructions and worried about his
scholarly reputation. The brochure, with its vision of new
religious and psychological order emerging from
a repressed society was meant to awaken educated
Russians in the USSR to the striking historical parallels.
Trubetskoi connected the past and the present in his
account of the period following the Mongol invasion of
Russian principalities in away that allowed him to see both
the Mongol invasion and the Bolshevik revolution as
periods of dramatic spiritual transformations crucial to the
emergence of Russian national identity (Yerushalmi, 1982;
Zerubavel, 1995).”28 It is hard not to recognize in
Trubetskoi’s description of Genghis-Khan’s nomads the
utopian project that the Eurasianists developed for
contemporary Russia, where the Revolution had allegedly
produced a new psychological type of men, decisive and
powerful, who would transform Russia on the Eurasianist
principles of the state ruled by a powerful idea. But,
perhaps, nowhere in Trubetskoi’s historical account was
the connection of the past and the present as visible as in
his description of the emergence of Muscovite Russia as
a result of the Mongol yoke.
Trubetskoi described the processes of transformation of
Moscow under the impact of the Mongols in the same way
the Eurasianists viewed the transformation of Russia under
the impact of the Bolsheviks: “The Russians’ anguish and
their keen awareness of the humiliation suffered by
Russian national pride merged with a strong new impres-
sion engendered by the grandeur of a foreign conception of
the state. All Russians were disoriented, the abyss seemed
to yawn before them at every step, and they began to
search desperately for some solid ground. An eruption of
acute spiritual tumult and turmoil was the result – complex
processes whose signiﬁcance is generally undervalued
(Trubetskoi, 1991, p. 175) Trubetskoi had found in the
distant past a pattern for the emergence of “national spir-
ituality” and “national rigor” and that pattern was also
rediscovered by the Eurasianists in Bolshevik Russia. The
Bolsheviks, too, had impressed upon the Russians
a “foreign conception of the state,” and the Eurasianists
spoke in their ﬁrst collection of the need to ﬁnd ﬁrm
grounds after the catastrophe. The Bolshevik “yoke,”
according to the Eurasianists, also generated a religious and
spiritual revival, of which the Eurasianists themselves were
but a part, and it led to the emergence of a new type of
people in Russia, active and decisive.28 Methodological insights for analyses of “national historical narra-
tives” informed by the reading of the past through particular lenses of the
present are provided by seminal works in Jewish history. Perhaps, the
most inﬂuential work has been Yerushalmi (1982). See also Zerubavel
(1995).According to Trubetskoi, the Mongol invasion and the
destruction of the Russian principalities by the Mongols
resulted in the “extraordinary vigorous development of
religious life. For ancient Rus’ the period of Tatar rule was
above all else an epoch of religion .” Let us recall that
Suvchinskii, one of Trubetskoi’s closest friends, insisted
that the Russian revolution “ﬂew under the sign of religious
transformation (Glebov, 2006, pp. 163–223; Suvchinskii,
1921, S. 14–27).” Trubetskoi insisted that the period of the
Mongol yoke saw “an intense religious orientation of the
inner life of Russians which suffused every product of
the spirit, especially art, with its colors. This powerful
upsurge in religious life was a natural accompaniment to
that revaluation of values, to that disillusionment with life,
which were caused by the calamity of the Tatar invasion”
(Trubetskoi, 1991, p. 176). The religious upheaval was par-
alleled in the 13th and 14th century Russia, according to
Trubetskoi, by “an idealization of the national past” and by
the rise of the spirit of heroism, “religious and nationalistic
(Trubetskoi, 1991, pp. 176–177).” At the same time, exam-
ples of heroism were offset by cases of “abject moral
degeneration”, yet another sign of a “creative” epoch. Tru-
betskoi’s conclusion was itself suffused with a hope for
national renovation and re-invigoration, at least in as far as
his interpretation of the post-Mongol period promised:
“Epochs of this sort, with their soaring ﬂights and steep
decline, epochs characterized by extreme psychological
contradictions that reﬂect a profound shock to a nation’s
spiritual life – such epochs create an atmosphere congenial
to the emergence of a new national type; they are harbin-
gers of the birth of a new era in the nation’s history
(Trubetskoi, 1991, p. 177).”
In accordance with these historical parallels, the Eura-
sianist scholars sought to uncover in Soviet Russia signs of
the dawn of a new national era. Some, like Suvchinskii and
Mirsky, found it in the realm of art and literature, and some,
like Trubetskoi and Jakobson, recognized its elements in
the emergence of a particularly Russian science. All Eura-
sianist thinkers believed that the Bolshevik dictatorship
presided over a profound transformation of Russian life,
and waited for the emergence of that new and decisive
“psychological type” of Russians that will recognize the
fault of the Bolsheviks’ Europeanizing spirit and embrace
Eurasianism as a guiding ideology. This expectation also led
to Eurasianism becoming mired in the web of underground
contacts with the Soviet secret services as the movement
attempted to propagate its ideas within the USSR. ***
The Eurasianist movement was not born out of any
encounter between the Russians and their steppe nomadic
neighbors. Rather, it was a product of cultural fermenta-
tion in the capitals of ﬁn-de-siècle Russia re-cast in the
post-revolutionary atmosphere of displacement and
disillusionment with Russia’s Europeanizing convulsions.
The Eurasianist thinkers took from the modernist milieu of
late imperial Russia its criticism of bourgeois society and
its interest in the spiritual and religious searches for
a re-invigoration of national life. In the aftermath of the
revolutionary disintegration of the Russian Empire, the
Eurasianist thinkers also mobilized Russia’s Asian con-
nections to construe a national mystique focused on the
Orthodox religiosity.
S. Glebov / Journal of Eurasian Studies 2 (2011) 103–114 113By the middle of the 1920s the Eurasianists had already
drawn the outline of this mystique. In 1926 Trubetskoi met
in Vienna Othmar Spann, one of those intellectuals in the
German-speaking world whose ideas helped create the
climate of animosity to liberalism and democracy in the
years before Hitler’s coming to power (Siegfried, 1974).”29
Following this encounter, Trubetskoi spent signiﬁcant
time elaborating a Eurasanist political theory, which resul-
ted in the conception of “ideocracy.” According to this
conception, a new type of society was to emerge to be ruled
by a particular group of people (the ruling layer, praviashchii
sloi). This group was to be constituted by a selection (otbor)
based on the “commonality of worldview (Trubetskoi,
1927). With these notions Trubetskoi completed the
translation of the national mystique into a fully ﬂedged
political conception akin to awhole range of ideologies that
fall under the rubric of “generic fascism” (Mosse, 1979,
pp. 1–45; Grifﬁn, 1993, pp. 1–55).30 Eurasianism presented
its own palingenetic myth of renovation of society based on
quasi-historical and irrational assumptions, and sought to
convert as many as possible to its cause both among the
Russian émigrés and in the USSR. As scholars begin to
unravel connections between the rise of fascist movements
and the imperial experiences (Grosse, 2005).31 Eurasian-
ism’s place among its European counterparts becomes less
and less peculiar. This place among European reactions to
modernity in the interwar period ironically subverts the
very notion of the Sonderweg development that Eurasian-
ism iterated and that underlies much of the use of Eurasia
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